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1. Introduction 
 
 Environmental concern has been considered the necessary prerequisite for global 
sustainable both explicitly and implicitly. While high levels of environmental concern 
appear to have developed over the past twenty  years, environmental degradation still 
advances at relatively high rates because individuals who express concern seldom engage 
in environmentally responsible behaviors (Maloney and Ward 1973; Scott and Willits 
1994). While it is true that such changes as those deemed necessary for sustainability can 
be brought about only slowly, the gap between attitudes and behavior in the 
environmental arena are alarming to many. Attempts to clarify and explain this gap have 
been slow in developing but are now beginning to appear in the environmental literature. 
Many of these relate, however, to the development of measurement instruments and the 
criticism of construct development (Stern, Dietz and Guagnano 1995) stemming from the 
conflicting results that have been found. In fact, contradictory results have been found in 
the relative impacts of socio-demographic, attitudinal, and concern on behavioral 
intention and behavioral measures.  
 Stern, Dietz and Guagnano 1995 suggest that this is because of the failure to 
develop a satisfactory causal model of environmental concern. In proposing such a model, 
they argue that the causal sequence begins at the institutional level of society and 
proceeds successively to value systems, general environmental beliefs, specific 
environmental beliefs, behavioral intentions, and behavior. The model is presented in 
Figure 1 below. This approach is taken in the present study which proposes to examine 
the relationship between the top three levels of the model.  Most environmental research 
in marketing has examined the lower three levels of the model and only recently have the 
value and institutional levels been examined.  While Stern, Dietz, and Guagnano (1995) 
and Grunert and Juhl (1995) have examined the values level of the model, Grunert-
Beckmann and Kilbourne (1997) and Kilbourne, McDonagh, and Prothero (1997) have 
begun the examination of the institutional level, or the dominant social paradigm (DSP), 
of contemporary Western industrial societies. We will now briefly examine the 
conceptual models used at these two levels. 
 
Figure 1 
Causal Model of Environmental Concern 
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Adapted from Stern, Dietz, and Guagnano (1995) 
 
2. Dominant Social Paradigm 
 
The DSP defines the cultural context within which society's members construct 
their world view. Milbrath (1984) has defined the DSP as "... the values, metaphysical 
beliefs, institutions, habits, etc. that collectively provide social lenses through which 
individuals and groups interpret their social world" (p. 7). As such, it is instrumental in 
individuals’ basic beliefs about their place in the cosmos, their perception of their own 
actions, and their beliefs about such basic institutionally derived constructs as justice and 
progress. It is precisely these constructs and beliefs that are instrumental in the 
development of sustainable societies and within which present conflicts, both 
intrapersonal and international, can be framed. 
 It is argued by van Dam and Apeldoorn (1996) that progress toward sustainability 
requires a reassessment of the relationship between micro-marketing objectives and 
macromarketing goals. Because of the interplay between state, business, and science in 
postindustrial societies (Beck 1995), or what we refer to here as politics, economics and 
technology, there is an inherent drive toward unsustainability (van Dam and Apeldoorn 
1996). To understand this seemingly intractable drive, it is necessary to examine the root 
causes that engender it.  This entails a thorough examination of the higher levels of the 
model used here.  While Grunert-Beckmann and Kilbourne (1997) examined the socio-
economic domain of the DSP and its relationship to value systems, there is second 
domain complicit in the development and interplay of value systems. This is the 
cosmological domain that entails the highest level of the DSP and includes three separate 
dimensions through which individuals define and operationalize their view of the world. 
These are human position in nature (anthropocentric-ecocentric), construction of nature 
(atomism-holism), and the functioning of nature (cooperative-competitive).  These 
dimensions have received scant attention within the environmental literature to date. 
Here, we will examine only the anthropocentric-ecocentric dimension and its relationship 
to value systems and environmental concern because of space limitations. 
 
2.1 Anthropocentric beliefs 
 
 The essential feature of the anthropocentric dimension of the cosmological 
domain is the belief that humans are separate from and ethically superior to the rest of 
nature.  As a result, humans consider themselves to be rightfully, the masters of nature 
subduing it for their own instrumental purposes.   With the demystification of nature 
(Lewis 1973), through scientific and technological development, its manipulation and 
exploitation were assured and resulted in “the death of nature” (Merchant 1980). The 
antipodal position to anthropocentrism is ecocentrism which considers nature to have 
inherent value regardless of its usefulness to humans (Shrivastava 1995; Purser, Park, and 
Montuori  1995; Thompson and Barton 1994). 
 There are two perspectives from which to examine the ecocentric position.  The 
first is the position that the objective is "human emancipation and fulfillment in an 
ecologically sustainable society (Eckersley 1992, p. 26)."  This position has been 
described as human welfare ecology (Kilbourne 1995; O’Riordan 1976). The second 
acknowledges the same objective but with a recognition of the moral standing of 
nonhuman world and its rights to continue evolving.  The primary point of departure 
between the two views is the position of humans in the biosphere.   
 Within the ecocentric view, there is no basis for assuming that humans represent 
the paragon of evolution with rights superseding or negating those of other life forms 
which are considered to have inherent value in their own right.  Ecocentric theorists 
postulate that the current ecological crisis stems from this over inflated sense of value, or, 
as Ehrenfeld (1978) calls it, the “arrogance of humanism.”  It is argued by O’Riordan 
(1976) that even the weaker forms of anthropocentrism such as conservationism and 
human welfare ecology are not sustainable since, in the presence of human crisis, they 
would be sacrificed for the more humanist perspectives. Kilbourne (1995) postulates five 
different environmental positions that vary by their position on a continuum from 
anthropocentrism to ecocentrism. These are, from the most anthropocentric to the most 
ecocentric, environmentalism, conservationism, human welfare, preservationism, and 
ecologism. 
 Thompson and Barton (1994) examined the effect of anthropocentric and 
ecocentric beliefs on attitudes toward the environment and concluded, albeit weakly, that 
ecocentric beliefs affected environmental attitudes as measured by three scales 
constructed for the study, conservation behaviors, self-reported actions, and 
environmental apathy.  However, the defined the anthropocentrism and ecocentrism as 
two different constructs rather than opposite ends of a continuum as would have been 
more consistent with the literature. This leads to the intuitively inadequate reflection that 
one might be an anthropocentric ecocentric since the two constructs are defined as 
independent of each other. It might also lead to measurement difficulties if the content of 
one scale is contained within the other. This would help to account for their weak and 
somewhat conflicting result suggesting that anthropocentrism has no effect but 
ecocentrism does. In the current study, we are taking the approach tied more directly to 
the conceptual literature which places the two constructs as antipodal rather than 
independent. 
 Consistent with Stern, Dietz, and Guagnano (1995), we conjecture here that the 
anthropocentric position that occupies the institutional level of the model, leads to certain 
values that serve to maintain the status quo that is motivated by the DSP.  Among these 
are the beliefs that humans are superior to nature, reasoning ability distinguishes humans 
from “lower” species, and property rights are more important than species rights 
(Kilbourne 1995). To tie the two levels of the model together, we will examine the 
relationship between anthropocentric beliefs and value systems directly through the use of 
the Schwartz Value Inventory (SVI). We will then examine the relationship between 
values and general environmental beliefs. 
 
2.2 Value systems 
 
Accordingly, values are those patterns by which individuals orient themselves in 
and adapt to their environment. These patterns were described by Tolman (1951) as basic 
conceptions about life which underlie an individual's behaviour. Values are both self-
centered and social-centered in the sense that they form the point of intersection between 
individual and society. As general orientation standards, they include external, social-
centered aspects insofar as they are effective as guiding principles established by the 
social environment. But they also include internal, self-centered aspects as standards 
internalized and accepted by the individual. Elsewhere (Grunert, K.G. Grunert, & 
Kristensen, 1994) we have argued that values are abstract mental constructs. They are 
assumed to be related indirectly to behaviour, i. .e., mediated by more concrete, mental 
constructs such as beliefs and attitudes (Grunert & Juhl, 1995; Homer & Kahle, 1988; 
Lastovicka, 1991; Schuermann, 1988; Vinson, Scott & Lamont, 1977). Since values serve 
as frame of reference for evaluating situations, other persons and the self in order to guide 
actions, they embody emotions as well. In other words, as a behaviour-motivating force, 
they obviously present cognitive-emotive categories. These categories constitute a given 
cultural context. When culture is meant to refer to shared meanings, we could therefore, 
from a cognitive-emotive perspective, define it as collectively shared cognitive-emotive 
structures. The more a set of cognitive-emotive categories is shared by a group of people, 
and the more the associations between them are alike, the more can this set of cognitive-
emotive categories be said to be part of their common culture. Likewise, the more such a 
set of cognitive-emotive categories and their interrelationships differ between two or 
more groups of people, the more we can say that they are culturally different.  
Differences in peoples' values are then differences in peoples' collectively shared 
cognitive-emotive structures. Values are therefore defined as cognitive-emotive 
categories of an abstract nature with a strong evaluative component. The way in which 
peoples' behaviour is influenced by their value systems - that is, the overall structure into 
which values are ordered by their importance as guiding principles for daily life - may be 
interpreted by the way in which less abstract cognitive-emotive categories, e.g., 
actionable objects in their environment, are associated with more abstract, motivating 
cognitive-emotive categories in their cognitive-emotive structure. The meaningful content 
of values can be described as cognitive-emotive representations of three types of 
universal human requirements: Biologically based needs of the organism, social 
interactional claims for interpersonal coordination, and social institutional demands for 
group welfare and survival (cf., Kluckhohn, 1951; Maslow, 1959; Rokeach, 1973). 
Hence, value systems serve both individualistic and collectivist interests as well as a 
mixture of these (cf., Hofstede & Bond, 1984; Triandis, 1985). As such, they bear a close 
relation to the DSP since they specify how the cultural context is perceived, evaluated, 
and internalized in order to justify individual actions. The position taken here regarding 
the relationship between the DSP and VS is that, while the DSP is prior to values (Stern, 
Dietz, and Guagnano 1995), they exist in a reflexive relationship through which values 
are both derived from and inform the DSP.  
 
2.3 The crossroads of society's norms and individual behaviour 
 
As argued above, it is suggested that the cultural context as reflected in the DSP 
provides a blueprint for the development of individual VS. Since values represent 
motivations, or criteria used by individuals to select and justify actions, they are supposed 
to differ in their structural relations to each other as well as in the importance attached to 
them. Figure 2 illustrates how the ten motivational domains of values, as postulated by 
the theory of Schwartz (1992), are related to each other, and the four higher-order 
dimensions into which they can be grouped. Adjacent value types are most compatible, 
whereas an increasing distance around the circular order indicates a decreasing 
compatibility, and therefore, an increasing conflict. Value types that emerge in opposing 
directions from the origin should be in greatest conflict (for more details on the content of 
the ten motivational domains see the Appendix 1).  
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Figure 2 - Schwartz Value Inventory
 
 
 
It is the content universe of each motivational domain that determines the nature 
of the relationship between values and other constructs rather than a single value which 
belongs to a certain motivational domain. Conceiving an individual's value system as an 
integrated structure of motivational goals, i.e., specifying the association of one value 
type with an external variable, such as attitudes or behaviour, has then implications for 
the associations of this variable with the other value types as well. Hence, assessing VS 
by this approach will allow the identification of the DSP's influence on anthropocentric 
beliefs and environmental concern. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
3.1 Hypotheses  
 
Based on the forgoing assessment, the following hypotheses were developed for testing. 
 H1: As individuals’ anthropocentric beliefs (ANTH) increase, their self-
transcendence (TRAN) value will decrease while their self-enhancement value (EGO) 
and conservationism value (CON) will increase. Openness values (OPEN) will be 
unaffected.  
 H2: As individuals’ scores on TRAN increase their perception of ecological 
problems and measures of concern will increase. As their scores on EGO and CON 
increase, their measures of ecological problems and concern will decrease. 
 H3: As individuals’ perception of ecological problems and concern increase, their 
willingness to trade off consumption and economy for environmental reasons will 
increase as will their perception of the requisite social change needed for environmental 
balance. 
 H4: Countries will differ on measures of concern and action, and the differences 
will be in accordance with the hypotheses in 1, 2, and 3.  
 
3.1 Sample 
 
 The sample for the present study consisted of 264 university students from three 
countries. There were 57 from Spain, 70 from The Netherlands, and 137 from Denmark.  
All respondents were selected on a convenience basis and were neither required to 
participate in the study nor paid to participate if they chose. Danish students were 
predominantly marketing majors, Dutch students were from the marketing area of an 
agricultural university, and the Spanish students were from a Sociology department. Thus 
there was a fairly wide spectrum of students used in the study. It is recognized by the 
researchers that there is a potential confounding of country with student type, but the 
diversity of type reflects a diversity of attitudes which was deemed necessary for the 
study. It was not “countryness” that was of interest, but variation in beliefs and values, 
and the diversity of attitudes provides this variation. Thus variations in results by country 
should not be interpreted as country differences per se, but DSP and VS differences 
between countries leading to different environmental beliefs. 
 
3.3 Questionnaire design 
 
The questionnaire consisted of five sections, each with different types of 
questions. The first section contained the Schwartz Value Inventory SVI (Schwartz, 
1992), in which respondents are asked to rate the importance of 57 values, belonging to 
the various motivational domains, as "a guiding principle in my life," using the following 
nine-point scale: 7 = of supreme importance, 6 = very important, 5, 4 (unlabelled), 3 = 
important, 2, 1 (unlabelled), 0 = not important, and -1 = opposed to my values. These 57 
values are presented with brief explanations of their meanings in parentheses, e.g., 
"equality (equal opportunities for all)" and "ambitious (hard-working, aspiring)." In order 
to minimize shifts in scale use, an anchoring technique was employed by requesting that 
respondents first determine the value of utmost importance to them, then the one whose 
importance is virtually non-existent, and finally that they rate the remaining values.  
The second section, with 30 seven point Likert type items, was used to assess the 
respondent's position on the DSP. There were six sets of five questions with the first three 
sets designed to measure attitudes towards the political, technological, and economic 
dimensions. The remaining three sets were to measure anthropocentric, atomistic, and 
competitive beliefs respectively. The anthropocentrism scale was the only one used in the 
present study. 
The third set of questions contained 15 items to measure attitudes about different 
ecological issues. These were derived from Milbrath (1984) and Cotgrove (1982). They 
reflect general ecological beliefs rather than specific instances of specific problems. The 
averages of the items making up these sets of scales were used as the numerical value in 
the study.  
The fourth section contained 15 seven point semantic differential type items to 
provide global measures of attitudes toward relevant social and ecological variables. For 
this study, ecological concern, perceived environmental damage, and necessary social 
change were the only three used. Each of these was considered a separate variable and the 
actual score of the respondent was used. For DSP variables, a higher score indicates a 
greater belief in the DSP and for the ecological scores, a higher score indicates a greater 
belief in environmental problems. 
The fifth section asked for a few demographic information, namely age, living 
status, gender, and type of place where the respondent had grown up. 
 
4. Analyses and Results 
 
4.1 Questionnaire refinement 
 
 Factor analysis was used to determine whether the various scales represented the 
dimensions intended. The results of the analysis indicated that the five items in the 
anthropocentrism scale formed a single dimension. The average of the five items was 
used as the measurement in the subsequent analyses. Cronbach’s alpha for the scale was 
.70 and the scale could not be improved by removing any items. 
 Since the study was of a cross cultural nature, those items in the SVI that have 
been shown to be unstable across cultures were removed from the data set. The remaining 
variables were factor analyzed yielding the four dimensions reflected in the higher order 
domains, self-transcendence, self-enhancement, conservationism, and openness. Each of 
these dimensions was reduced by the factor analysis however. TRAN maintained seven 
items, EGO resulted in three items, CON resulted in three items, and OPEN had five 
items. As before, the means of the items in each scale were used for the remaining 
analyses. The alpha scores for each of the four scales were 0.80 for TRAN, 0.68 for EGO, 
0.59 for CON, and 0.75 for OPEN. 
 The scale for the perception of ecological problems (ECO) was reduced to six 
items through the factor analysis. These related to general ecological problems the 
respondent thought might exist. The alpha coefficient for this scale was 0.81 and the 
mean of the items was used as the measurement. The remaining variables in the study 
were all unidimensional and required no further analysis. 
 
4.2 Analysis 
 
 In the first stage of the analysis, simple regression was used to determine the 
relationship between ANTH and TRAN, EGO, CON, and OPEN, i.e., the relationship 
between the DSP and VS as suggested in hypothesis 1 above. The results of this analysis 
are presented in Table 1 below. As can be seen in the table, the hypotheses were 
confirmed. The relationship between ANTH and TRAN is negative as hypothesized 
indicating that as the individuals’ beliefs are more anthropocentric than ecocentric, their 
measure of self-transcendent values becomes more negative. There can also be seen the 
positive relationship between ANTH and EGO and CON with the latter being only 
marginally significant. There was no relationship between ANTH and OPEN as 
predicted.  
 
Table 1 
Relationship between DSP and VS 
 
 TRAN EGO CON OPEN 
ANTH b-value -0.39 0.31 0.13 -0.11 
p-value 0.001 .001 0.09 0.13 
  
 In the second stage of the analysis, multiple regression was used to determine the 
influence of VS on environmental beliefs and concern. Three separate regressions were 
run, one with each of three dependent variables, perception of ecological problems 
(ECO), environmental concern (CONC), and perception of the degree of environmental 
damage (COND). For each of these dependent variables, TRAN, EGO, CON, and OPEN 
were the independent variables. The results of this analysis, presented in Table 2, 
substantially confirm the relationships in hypothesis 2.  
 
Table 2 
Regression Coefficients for Effect of VS on Environmental Measures 
 
 TRAN EGO CON OPEN Adjusted R2 
ECO 0.331 -0.201 -0.07 0.09 0.28 
CONC 0.461 -0.06 -0.123 -0.143 0.16 
COND 0.391 -0.092 00.112 0.08 0.22 
1
 p-value < .01;  2 p-value < .05;  3 p-value < .08 
 
 In this stage of the analysis, most, but not all, of the relationships were confirmed. 
TRAN was significant at less than .01 for all three of the dependent variables. It can also 
be seen that the direction of the relationships were all positive as predicted. EGO was 
significant in two of the three dependent variables, ECO and COND, but not in the third. 
Again, the direction of the relationship was negative as predicted. CON was significant 
for COND and marginally significant for CONC, but not for ECO. Here the direction of 
the relationship was negative for CONC and positive for COND. Finally, OPEN was 
marginally significant in the negative direction for CONC which was not predicted in the 
hypotheses. 
 In the third stage of the analysis, regression was again used to determine the 
relationship between environmental measures and the individual’s expressed willingness 
to reduce consumption (CONS) and trade off economic well-being for environmental 
well-being (TRAD). The third dependent variable was the amount of social change 
perceived to be necessary for ecological well-being to ensue (SOC). In this analysis, 
perceptions of the environment were used as the independent variables. The results of this 
analysis, presented in Table 3, confirm the hypotheses as stated. In this case, all 
coefficients are in the predicted direction and all are significant at less than traditional 
levels except  
 
Table 3 
Regression Coefficients for Effect of Environmental Measures 
on Willingness to Change and Degree of Social Change 
 
 ECO CONC COND Adjusted R2 
CONS 0.161 0.20 0.39 0.24 
TRAD 0.24 0.22 0.39 0.37 
SOC 0.39 0.122 0.26 0.23 
1
 p-value < .08; 2 p-value < .06; All unnumbered coefficients are significant at p < .02 
 
 In the final stage of the analysis, differences between countries regarding 
respondents’ willing to change and perceptions of necessary social change were 
examined. In this analysis, ANOVA was used to determine if differences between 
countries existed and Duncan’s Multiple Range Test was used to determine which 
countries were different if differences existed. Table 4 presents the results of this analysis 
and includes only the variables that were significantly different between countries. 
Spanish respondents were significantly lower than the others on anthropocentrism and 
self-enhancement. At the same time, they were significantly higher on self-transcendence, 
belief in environmental problems, and perception that the condition of the environment is 
deteriorating. Finally, it can be seen that Spanish respondents were more willing to 
consume less in the future than the others and perceived that greater social change was 
necessary to achieve environmental well-being than did Danish respondents. Those from 
The Netherlands were intermediate on the latter variable.   
 
Table 4 
Country Differences 
 
 ANTH TRAN EGO ECO COND CONS SOC  
SPAIN 3.0a 5.2a 1.4a 6.1a 6.1a 5.9a 5.8a 
DENMARK 3.1a 3.7b 2.3b 5.5b 5.5b 5.0b 5.2b 
NETHERLANDS 3.5b 4.2c 2.2b 5.1c 5.5b 5.2b 5.4 
P-VALUE .001 .001 .001 .001 .003 .003 .018 
Means with the same letter are not different from each other 
 
 
5. Discussion 
 
 It has been argued here that the model presented by Stern, Dietz, and Guagnano 
(1995) represents a step in the right direction in the analysis of environmental attitudes. 
This model postulates that the environmental problem must be analyzed from the 
institutional level of society down to behavior as in Figure 1. Most research to date has 
been conducted at the lowest three levels of the model effectively ignoring the top two 
levels. While a few researchers have begun the analysis at the level of value systems, only 
a few studies have begun the examination of the institutional, or DSP, level. Kilbourne, 
McDonagh, and Prothero (1997) and Grunert-Beckmann and Kilbourne (1997) examined 
the political, economic, and technological dimensions of the DSP and Thompson and 
Barton (1994) examined the anthropocentrism dimension. Only Grunert-Beckmann and 
Kilbourne (1997) took in the institutional, values systems, and general environmental 
belief levels of the model, however. This study represents an extension of previous work 
by including the anthropocentrism dimension with the lower levels of the model. 
 Using samples from three different countries, Denmark, Spain, and The 
Netherlands, the study provides an examination of the model but is restricted to only part 
of the DSP in that it includes only the anthropocentrism dimension. The results of the 
study provide sufficient evidence about the model to warrant further research taking in 
the entire model, however. In the first stage of the analysis it was shown that the 
anthropocentrism dimension of the DSP was related to two of the higher order 
dimensions of VS, self-transcendence and self-enhancement. The specific relationship 
was established as inverse for TRAN and direct for EGO as was hypothesized.  This 
suggests that if individuals are high on the ANTH dimension of the DSP, this will lead to 
values that are antithetical to environmentally responsible behavior. Self-enhancing 
individuals seek to further their own personal interest or achievements by securing power 
over others and their environment. They would thus be less likely to consider 
environmental consequences of their behavior. Conversely, self-transcendence 
individuals are more concerned with others and are prone to universalize their actions by 
considering the larger consequences of them. As can be gathered from this, more 
anthropocentric individuals would tend toward EGO and more ecocentric individuals 
would be higher on TRAN. This is supported by the analysis. 
 The next link in the model is that between VS and general ecological beliefs. The 
latter is determined in this study through three measures of environmental attitudes, 
perception of the existence of ecological problems, environmental concern, and 
perception of the condition of the environment. The analysis indicates that the two most 
important determinants of environmental attitudes are TRAN and EGO. As hypothesized, 
TRAN is positively related to environmental attitudes and EGO is negatively related. This 
relationship can again be attributed the nature of the two value domains. Individuals high 
on TRAN universalize the consequences of their actions beyond themselves and are not 
oriented toward power and external control, i.e., they would tend to be ecocentric. 
Conversely, those high on EGO seek power and control. Their beliefs about the 
environment and its condition would be moderated by their power and control orientation 
resulting in what Ehrenfeld (1978) refers to as the arrogance of humanism, the erroneous 
belief that power and control can be exercised effectively over nature. Consequently they 
would be less likely to be concerned about environmental problems and their relationship 
to them. This is also supported by the results of the study. 
 The model suggests that from here, one’s general environmental beliefs would 
lead to behavioral intentions in a general rather than specific way.  This suggests that 
links to such specific behaviors as recycling or energy conservation might be less 
predictable than the willingness to make personal tradeoffs for environmental well-being. 
This proposition was examined in stage three of the analysis. Here, general environmental 
attitudes were shown to directly affect willingness to consume less and to trade off 
economy for environment. Further, it was shown that individuals with high levels of 
concern believed that  greater social change was necessary to achieve environmental well-
being. This is the link that has been demonstrated in past environmentally related 
marketing research, but without the structural antecedents to it. It suggests that, not 
surprisingly, one is more likely to react positively to the environment if environmental 
concern is high. 
 Finally, differences between the countries in the sample were examined and it was 
found that respondents from the different countries held very different views at all levels 
of the model. The results indicated that respondents from Spain were significantly higher 
on both willingness to consume less and the amount of social change necessary to achieve 
environmental well-being. For CONS, Denmark and The Netherlands were not different 
from each other, and for SOC, Denmark was significantly lower than Spain while The 
Netherlands was intermediate and not different from either of the others. The differences 
between countries are not revealing however, unless we also examine the antecedent 
conditions. When the entire model is examined in sequence from the DSP to VS to 
general environmental beliefs, the lower level measure of intentions becomes more 
meaningful. 
 It appears then that Spanish respondents exhibit the greatest level of concern 
because they are the least anthropocentric (most ecocentric), the highest on self-
transcendence, lowest on self-enhancement, believe to a greater extent that ecological 
problems do exist, and perceive that the condition of the environment is deteriorating. 
According to the model proposed, this should result in a greater willingness to consume 
less than respondents in the other two countries and the perception that greater social 
change is necessary to achieve environmental well-being. This is supported by the data 
through most of the model. The only exception is their willingness to trade off economy 
for environment which was not significant, although it did exhibit the same pattern as the 
other two measures. Thus, while it is true that respondents from the three countries differ 
in their environmental attitudes, the differences can be attributed to their positions on the 
DSP, VS, and general environmental beliefs. This provides support for the model 
suggesting that environmental attitudes are a much more complex phenomenon than is 
indicated by previous research that examined only the lower levels of the model. 
 Future research need to focus on all levels of the model simultaneously if a better 
understanding of environmental behavior is to be achieved. The simplistic notion that 
increasing environmental concern will somehow result in environmentally benign 
behavior should by now be left behind in favor of a more comprehensive view of the 
problem. To effect enduring transformations in behavior, the problem must be addressed 
at all levels of the model with changes effected at all levels from the DSP down to 
specific behaviors. Starting at the lower levels and letting attitudes filter upward through 
feedback loops, while useful in the absence of another strategy, may well be too slow to 
circumvent environmental decline. The more effective strategy would be to start at the top 
and work down. 
 
6. Limitations 
 
 There are a number of limitations in the present study which must be recognized. 
The most obvious is the limited sample consisting of university students. The scope of the 
study is currently being expanded to include random samples for the three countries in the 
study and others as well. Because of the limited sample size, a more sophisticated method 
of analysis could not be used.  While LISREL or path analysis would be preferred, the 
number of variables measured precluded their use here. Likewise, the entire domain of 
the DSP could not be examined for the same reasons. The additional data that are 
currently being collected will rectify both of these problems. It was felt, however, that the 
somewhat exploratory nature of the study justified proceeding despite these immediate 
limitations. 
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Appendix 1: Ten motivational domains of values 
 
 
• Self-direction (SDI, individualistic domain): 
The motivation for this value type is independent thought and action, derived from the organismic 
need for mastery and control through choosing, creating, and exploring, and interactional 
requirements of autonomy and independence. It means to be unconstrained by externally imposed 
limits. 
• Stimulation (STI, individualistic domain): 
Stimulation values are related to the need for variety in order to maintain an optimal level of 
activation and their motivational goals are excitement, novelty, and challenge in life. 
• Hedonism (HED, individualistic domain): 
Closely related to stimulation, this value type is described as representing pleasure and sensuous 
gratification for oneself. 
• Achievement (ACH, individualistic domain): 
This domain is defined by the goal of personal success through demonstrating competence according 
to social standards and thereby obtaining social approval. 
• Power (POW, individualistic domain): 
The central goal of power values is the attainment of social status and prestige, control or dominance 
over people and resources. 
• Security (SEC, individualistic and collectivist domain): 
This motivational domain derives from basic individual and group requirements and represents the 
goal of safety, harmony, and stability of society, of relationships, and of self. 
• Conformity (CON, collectivist domain): 
Restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm others and violate social 
expectations and norms, this is the defining goal of this value type. 
• Tradition (TRA, collectivist domain): 
The motivational goal of tradition values consists of respect, commitment, and acceptance of the 
customs and ideas that one's culture or religion imposes on the individual. 
• Spirituality (SPI, collectivist domain): 
This domain should encompass all those values that represent the attainment of meaning in life and 
inner harmony through transcending everyday reality. 
• Benevolence (BEN, collectivist domain): 
Benevolence values are motivated by the goal to preserve and enhance the welfare of those people 
with whom one is in frequent personal contact. 
• Universalism (UNI, individualistic and collectivist domain): 
This domains' motivational goal consists of the understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and 
protection of the welfare of all people and nature. 
 
 
 
